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Amongst the wealth of concerns raised by Artificial Intelligence (“AI”), one is the risk 
that the deployment of algorithmic pricing agents on markets will increase occurrences 
of tacit collusion by orders of magnitude, and well beyond the oligopoly setting where 
such markets failures have been traditionally observed. This concern has already 
generated policy interest, and regulatory options are now commonly discussed at  
academic, commercial and official conferences. At the same time, however, we remain 
in lack of understanding of whether current AI technology holds the capabilities that 
entitle algorithmic pricing agents to autonomously enter into tacitly collusive strategies 
without human intervention. In this paper, we look at three plain-vanilla 
Reinforcement Learning (“RL”) technologies, and attempt to understand whether their 
introduction at scale on markets can lead to tacit collusion.  While we do not deny the 
fact that smart pricing agents can enter into tacit collusion and that regulators may be 
right to be vigilant, we find that there are several technological challenges in the 
general realm of RL that mitigate this risk.  
 
Our paper proceeds in five steps. We first discuss the algorithmic tacit collusion 
conjecture (I). We then provide a non technical overview of reinforcement learning 
technologies (II). We then move on to discuss how naïve single agent Q-learning (III) 
and  multi-agent Q-learning (IV) interact as market players. We close with a discussion 
of how technological challenges fragilize the algorithmic tacit collusion conjecture (V). 
 
I. The Algorithmic Tacit Collusion Conjecture 
 
The claim has recently been made that the generalization of pricing algorithms on 
markets, and in particular of AI in pricing algorithms, will make tacit collusion more 
common.1 Tacit collusion occurs when oligopolists coordinate their prices (and/or any 
other variable) and jointly achieve supra-competitive profits, without the adoption of 
any institutional arrangement (a contract, a combination, an agreement, a joint-
venture, a trade association, etc.).2 Tacit collusion represents a deviation from the 
competitive equilibrium. It generates reductions in welfare similar in nature to those 
caused by cartels.  Tacit collusion is a Nash equilibrium the emergence of which 
demands strict conditions to be met. Oligopolists must be able to effectively detect and 
punish any deviation by another oligopolists from the collusive equilibrium. 
Otherwise, each oligopolist will have an incentive to cheat on its rivals, and prices will 
revert to the competitive level.  
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In economics, the concept of tacit collusion is well admitted. Since the early intuitions 
of Chamberlin in 1929,3 non cooperative game theory has shown that when firms meet 
repeatedly and for an infinite amount of times, tacit collusion is a likely equilibrium 
under certain restricted conditions.4 A point of relative agreement in the literature is 
that tacit collusion is only sustainable in relatively concentrated markets.  That said, 
most papers do not take a definitive view on the n number of oligopoly firms at which 
tacit collusion occurs. Selten once famously wrote that “4 are few and 6 are many”.  
 
With algorithms, several pieces of legal scholarship have advanced the conjecture that 
tacit collusion will be sustainable in markets which no longer need significant levels of 
oligopoly concentration.  Ezrachi and Stucke write that an “industry’s shift to pricing 
algorithms can spread tacit collusion beyond duopolies to markets with five or six 
large firms”.5 In a paper on “Robosellers” to which firms delegate pricing, Merah 
sustains that “automated pricing via algorithmic processing of collected mass data 
may tend to lead pricing above the competitive level, either via tacit collusion or more 
robust cartel formation”.6 And a review paper of the OECD indicates that “algorithms 
might affect some characteristics of digital markets to such an extent that tacit 
collusion could become sustainable in a wider range of circumstances possibly 
expanding the oligopoly problem to non-oligopolistic market structures”.7 
 
This literature remains, however, scant on the empirical evidence of algorithmic tacit 
collusion. Admittedly, the legal scholarship has attempted to document what it 
perceives to be perverse instatiations of the problem. Yet, the evidence adduced 
remains below the threshold of accuracy, consistency, reliability and exhaustiveness 
necessary to drive the point home. Besides stories from mainstream news agencies and 
press outlets, most of the evidence consists of extrapolations from past or ongoing 
cases where the use of online technology on concentrated markets has introduced 
enough transparency to ultimately degenerate into man-made tacit collusion.8 For 
instance, Ezrachi and Stucke discuss the case of retail petrol oligopoly markets in 
Germany, Chile and Australia where Government mandated online price posting. They 
show how Government-imposed real-time pricing obligations paradoxically facilitated 
tacit collusion. With this, they draw a parallel with the similar effect that could obtain 
with introduction of pricing algorithms in oligopoly markets. But in all those cases, 
several essential determinants conducive to tacit collusion were arguably already 
present, and the use of algorithmic technology simply removed the last obstacle to it. 
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What this means is subtle, but critical, namely that algorithms were not 
determinatively, and perhaps not even significantly causal of tacit collusion.  
 
A second, and equally crucial point, is that none of those cases features humanless tacit 
collusion. This is important, because at the heart of the algorithmic tacit collusion 
conjecture lies a situation in which pricing and quantity decisions are entirely 
delegated to algorithm-driven robo-sellers.9 In other words, we still remain in lack of 
understanding of whether algorithmic pricing agents can autonomously enter into 
tacitly collusive strategies, without human intervention. 
 
Those uncertainties that we stress do not arise in a vacuum. Pricing algorithms have 
been brought to bear on many markets for years, and available anecdotal evidence does 
not lean in support of the conjecture. Across past decades, the long term price levels 
observed in algorithmic-intense industries like airlines10 and electricity11 denote a 
steady decline (see graphs below). True that such trends do not preclude periodical 
occurrences of tacit collusion. Yet, the tacit collusion conjecture envisions a systemic 
tacit collusion effect, which is not borne out by historical evidence. In fact, regulators 
have tinkered with those markets in order to improve the coordination of market 
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As if this was not all, a growing number of anecdotes upset the idea that algorithms are 
good at coordinating. The United Airlines (“UA”) passenger removal scandal is a case 
in point. What we see here is in reality two things. First, we observe a coordination 
failure between distinct algorithms – a corporate scheduling algorithm, a corporate 
financial algorithm and a customer value algorithm – used in a same firm to allocate 
overbooked seats, which take erroneous decisions sequentially without looking at the 
big picture.12 Second,  we see a firm that experiences algorithmic tyranny by delegating 
its entire decision-making process to algorithms, by contrast to other – and many firms 
– who keep a human in the loop to avoid market backlash.  
 
Short of empirical evidence, discrete attempts have been made by economists to 
discuss the issue in formal terms. In an early paper, Schinkel discusses a bootlegged 
version of the video game Ms. PacMan which features three ghosts whose mission is 
to catch Ms. PacMan.13 In the game, the ghosts have creativity. As a result, the ghosts 
always win. Yet, Schinkel does not discuss whether the ghosts resort to coordination to 
achieve this equilibrium. 
 
Salceldo develops a more realistic model in which two firms use algorithms to set 
prices.14 An important feature is that at localized points in time, each duopolist is able 
to “decode” the other’s algorithm, and revise its own algorithm in response. The 
hypothesis studied in the paper posits that player 1 moves to adopt an algorithm that 
prices competitively, but is programmed to match any price increases by its rival. In 
this scenario, the best response of player 2 is to read this as a “proposal” to increase 
prices in parallel. As long as player 1 cannot revise its algorithm too quickly, player 2 
will read this as a firm commitment to increase prices, and thus move away from the 
competitive equilibrium price. In the model, prices are fixed in the short run, so that 
algorithms can only be revised infrequently. The model’s spectacular conclusion is that 
collusion is “inevitable”.  In addition, it suggests that this equilibrium is robust to an 
increase in the number of firms. 
 
However, Salceldo’s competition v imitation optimization function describes a 
restricted type of signalling competition with credible commitments in oligopoly 
markets. A more general specification robust to various forms of oligopoly markets 
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authoritarianism-created-a-corporate-nightmare-at-united-92d9bbdf1144  
13 Schinkel, Maarten Pieter. Market oversight games. Vol. 378. Amsterdam University Press, 2011. 




would feature an optimizing algorithm with a general profit maximization function.  
The algorithm would be programmed to select a price level, not simply to make a binary 
choice between zero profits (competition) and full coordination (imitation). Besides, 
one can question whether the assumptions of decoding and of instant optimization are 
realistic. He wonders whether Q-learning systems can approximate this. Last, 
Salcedo’s paper does not discuss the impact of competitive entry. 
 
Perhaps more progress is to expect from the fields of algorithmic game theory and 
artificial economics, which lies at the interesection of economics and computer science. 
In this emerging field, a seminal experiment has shown that RL algorithmic agents in 
a Cournot oligopoly can reach a tacit collusion equilibrium.15 Yet, subsequent studies 
have demonstrated that this finding is not robust to small perturbations in costs, prices 
or other parameters, thereby suggesting that the constraints that undermine tacit 
collusion amongst human agents are equally present for RL algorithmic agents.16 This 
finding may not be surprising since the main inspiration for temporal-difference 
learning principle – upon which Q-learning algorithm is based – is the learning process 
in animals/humans.   
 
With this background, we investigate the tacit collusion conjecture from a 
technological perspective. We provide an analysis of a subset of mainstream RL 
techniques called Q-learning agents. We chose them because Q-learning agents can 
learn about their environment and competitors, and potentially, enter into tacit 
collusion.17 Our goal is to objectively assess the actual collusive capabilities of RL 
algorithms on markets.  
 
II. Overview of Reinforcement Learning 
Our study focuses on reinforcement learning algorithms. RL is a suitable framework 
to study the interaction of profit maximizing algorithmic agents because it shares 
many analogies with the situation of oligopolists in markets:  
 
 RL is a trial-and-error approach. With RL, a pricing agent thus has to 
try different strategies (policies/actions) before deciding which one to 
choose 
 A RL pricing agent faces an exploration v exploitation tradeoff in 
choosing the next action, which can be compared to pricing tradeoffs in 
oligopoly markets 
 Rewards are delayed as a RL pricing agent does not immediately know 
whether it chose the best policy (i.e. whether they took the most 
“optimal” action), in line with the idea that prices on markets do not 
adjust instantly 
                                                          
15 Waltman, Ludo, and Uzay Kaymak. "Q-learning agents in a Cournot oligopoly model." Journal of 
Economic Dynamics and Control 32.10 (2008): 3275-3293. 
16 Izquierdo, Segismundo S., and Luis R. Izquierdo. "The “Win-Continue, Lose-Reverse” rule in Cournot 
oligopolies: robustness of collusive outcomes." Advances in Artificial Economics. Springer, Cham, 2015. 
33-44. 
17 Note that other studies on algorithms and collusion that do not reach completely robust results have 
been produced recently, yet they do not cover Q-learning algorithms. See, for instance, Crandall, Jacob 
W., et al. "Cooperating with Machines." arXiv preprint arXiv:1703.06207 (2017). And for an overview, 
see Deng, Ai, (2017). “When Machines Learn to Collude: Lessons from a Recent Research Study on 
Artificial Intelligence”, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3029662 
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 A RL pricing agent tries to learn the best actions to outperform its 
opponents or to reach a consensus (Nash equilibrium of tacit collusion). 
In that respect, RL encourages or discourages certain actions via 
positive or negative feedback 
 
In RL, a pricing agent learns by interacting with its environment, which can be 
assumed to be dynamic.  At any given time, t, the agent is considered to be in a state, s. 
It chooses an action, a, to execute, e.g. to raise its price, which results in a 
corresponding change in s. The agent receives a reward, which denotes the utility of 
making this decision. 
 
One of the most popular RL techniques is the Q-learning algorithm. It has been 
extensively studied in the past. Its simplicity and ease-of-use has made it a de-facto 
choice in a diverse range of applications, such as robotic control, video games or ad-
placement on the web. The Q-Learning algorithm has also been commonly employed 
for dynamic pricing applications like airline fares or bids placed on wholesale 
electricity markets.  
 
However, and as can be seen from those examples, most existing applications of Q-
learning algorithms consist in what can be called single-agent Q-learning. They are 
unsuitable for multi-agent environments as they ignore the other agents’ rewards. 
Therefore, as we discuss below, a single-agent configuration is often too restrictive for 
real-world, complex problems, such as dynamic pricing in oligopolistic markets, with 
n potentially competing agents.  Following a brief description of the single agent Q-
learning algorithm – which we call naïve Q-learning – we move on to discuss the case 
of multiple agents (multi-agent). Specifically, we discuss the MinMax Q-learning 
algorithm for zero-sum games, and the NashQ Learning for general-sum games.  
 
III. Naïve Q-Learning Algorithm 
 
In essence, a naïve Q-learning algorithm is a profit-maximizing agent which, in any 
given state s, chooses an action a that yields the maximum utility. The utility is often 
expressed as 𝑄(𝑠, 𝑎). To compute this value, the agent takes into account the immediate 
reward for taking the action as well as the discounted long-term reward. The latter is 
often operationalized as the Q value in the resulting state. 
Formally, the (naïve) Q-learning procedure can be written as follows:  
 For each state-action  pair, initialize a Q-table (matrix), for e.g. such that each  
values in the table is 0 initially 
 At each time step, the agent, in state s, chooses an action a which maximizes 
𝑄(𝑠, 𝑎) if the agent is in an exploitaton mode. It can choose another action, if 
he decides to explore its environment.   
 This action will generate an immediate reward  and will transform the state to 
move from s to s’. A corresponding table entry is then updated with the 






 𝑟௧: immediate reward, available from the payoff matrix. 
 max
௕
𝑄௧(𝑠ᇱ, 𝑏): highest utility (Q) value of action in next state 
 α: learning rate 
 β: discount factor 
 
The above procedure is repeated until a terminal state is reached. 
In essence, a Q-learning agent attempts to find the best actions, known as the optimal 
policy, π. 
As mentioned earlier, (naïve) Q-learning has been predominantly employed in single-
agent applications. For instance, (naïve) Q-learning is used as decision support system 
for central authorities tasked with allocation choices: electricity capacity, traffic 
management, logistics, etc.  Moreover, (naïve) Q-learning can also assist decentralized 
players make profit maximizing decisions, without however considering other agents 
strategies. A common example is yield management by airlines. While ticket pricing is 
beyond the control of an airline company, a significant influence can be exercised 
through Q-learning algorithms over seat allocation and overbooking.18 However, in 
oligopoly markets, we contemplate the involvement and interaction of several 
decentralized agents.   
To apply (naïve) Q-learning in oligopoly markets, one possibility would be to 
straightforwardly apply Q-learning to each of the agents. However, this approach has 
a major limitation19: the environment is non-stationary due to the presence of other 
agents, who are all adapting their behavior (in response to each other). In those 
circumstances, the theoretical underpinnings of Q-learning (e.g. convergence towards 
an optimal policy) no longer apply. Put differently, naïve Q-learning simply does not 
apply. It breaks down. 
Several alternative technologies have been proposed to overcome the single-agent 
limitation of the (naïve) Q-learning algorithm. We discuss hereafter the two most 
popular multi-agent solutions, namely MinMax Q-learning and Nash Q-learning. We 
give more exposure to Nash Q-learning as it can be considered as a more general case 
of MinMax Q-learning.  Furthermore, even though these algorithms can handle any 
number n of agents, we discuss a duopoly scenario where n=2 for ease of 
understanding. This choice is also apposite, because by selecting an environment that 
is most endogenously conducive to tacit collusion, we give maximum credence to the 
tacit collusion conjecture, and therefore cannot be accused of a bias against it.  
 
IV. Multi-Agent Q-Learning 
 
                                                          
18 Gosavi and Bandla, A Reinforcement Learnign Approach ____. 
19 Hu, Junling, and Michael P. Wellman. "Nash Q-learning for general-sum stochastic games." Journal 
of machine learning research 4.Nov (2003): 1039-1069. 
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Two variants of Q-learning agents consider multi agents settings and introduce the 
theoretical possibility of interaction and interdependence necessary to generate tacit 
collusion.We discuss them in turn.  
1. Zero-Sum Games and MinMax Q-Learning 
Zero-sum games are an instance of multi-agent environments. The peculiarity of such 
games is that one agent’s gains correspond to the other agents’ losses and vice-versa. 
The agents have strictly “opposing” interests. 
Consider the case of a 2-agent (player) zero-sum game. Since these 2 agents have 
exactly the opposite interests (rewards), their respective Q-matrices (c.f. naïve Q-
learning procedure presented earlier), , are related, such that: 
𝑀ଵ =  −𝑀ଶ 
Thus, the game can simplified by considering either 𝑀ଵ or 𝑀ଶ. The MinMax20 Q-
learning algorithm exploits this relationship: If an agent knows its Q-matrix, it can also 
deduce that of its opponents. Consequently, it can minimize the rewards of the other 
agents’ rewards, and choose its own optimal action after that. 
Formally, MinMax Q-learning can be expressed as shown below (we omitted some 
indices to simplify the equation compare the naïve Q-learning) 
  












where 𝜋௦(𝑎) gives the probability of following the agent performing action 𝑎. 
 
For more details, we refer the reader to the work of Littman18 
MinMax Q-learning performs better than the naïve Q-learning  in multi-agent 
environments.  However, MinMax Q-learning can only be applied to support decision-
making in situations where the agents pursue opposite goals. Thus, their 
implementation in dynamic pricing applications on oligopoly markets  is highly 
unlikely.  In such settings, algorithmic pricing agents (for instance, pricing bots from 
rival e-commerce companies) all pursue a same goal of profit maximization. Given that 
                                                          
20 Michael L. Littman. Markov games as a framework for multi-agent reinforcement learning. In 
Eleventh International Conference on Machine Learning, pages 157–163. New Brunswick, 1994 
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the basic tenet of MinMax Q-learning is that the agents pursue different goals, it is hard 
to envisage that they can have ability and/or incentives to engage into collusion, tacit 
or otherwise. 
2. General-Sum Games and NashQ-Learning 
General-sum games can be considered as a more generic type of zero-sum game. They 
are less restrictive than zero-sum games – the latter constraining the agents to pursue 
opposite rewards – and therefore of higher relevance to the study of the tacit collusion 
conjecture on oligopoly markets. 
In this variant, the agents’ respective matrices,  and  are unrelated. Recall that in zero-
sum games, these matrices would be “opposite” (negative) of each other, and thus, 
would sum up to zero.21 Moreover, in general-sum games, agents are unaware of each 
other’s payoff function and state-transition probabilities. 
A common solution in general-sum games is that agents reach a Nash equilibrium:22 
each agent’s action is the best response to other agents’ actions, and no agent can 
achieve a better result by deviating (we refer to such agents as Nash Q-leaning agents). 
 In light of this, it cannot be excluded that Nash Q-learning agents could potentially 
enter into collusion. For instance, profit-maximizing Nash Q-learning agents could set 
their prices in response to each other until a point is reached where no agent has any 
incentive to deviate from this price level given what it expects others to do (the 
condition of Nash equilibrium is reached). And there is theoretical way to define a Nash 
Q-value which corresponds to the expected sum of (discounted) rewards when all 
agents follow specific Nash equilibrium strategies.23 
We can briefly illustrate the operation of a Nash Q-learning pricing agents, considering 
n=2 agents for simplicity. As will be seen, this simple example nonetheless highlights 
some of the key challenges with Nash Q-learning for multi-agents, general-sum games 
environment. 
To start, let us recall that (i) in the case of single-agent (naïve) Q-learning, we only had 
one agent, and, thus, only one payoffs matrix, with each entry indicating the payoffs 
for different state-action pairs; and (ii) in the case of multi-agent zero-sum games, the 
agents’ payoffs matrices were strictly the opposite of each other, and summed to zero 
(in such games one agent’s gains is exactly the other agents’ losses).   
                                                          
21 Hu, Junling, and Michael P. Wellman. "Nash Q-learning for general-sum stochastic games." Journal 
of machine learning research 4.Nov (2003): 1039-1069. 
22 Busoniu, Lucian, Robert Babuska, and Bart De Schutter. "A comprehensive survey of multiagent 
reinforcement learning." IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, And Cybernetics-Part C: Applications 
and Reviews, 38 (2), 2008(2008). 
23 Hu, Junling, and Michael P. Wellman. "Multiagent reinforcement learning: theoretical framework and 
an algorithm." ICML. Vol. 98. 1998. This contrasts with the single-agent, naïve Q-learning scenario, 
whereby rewards depend only on the agent’s individual strategy. For the multi-agent (general-sum) case, 
the naïve Q-learning algorithm has to be extended by incorporating the joint actions of the other agents 
in the environment.   
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The situation is different for general sum-games. Here, the agents’ payoffs matrices are 
unrelated to each other. We therefore need to explicitly represent information about 
the other agents.   
For a given agent k, k=1,2 in our 2-agents setting, let the Q-matrix for state s be Qk(s) 
with 
 Rows: a1 A1; actions of agent 1 
 Columns: a2 A2; actions of agent 2 
 Entries: Qk(s,a1, a2); payoffs of agent k in state s, considering joint agent 
actions 
 
For instance, in a given state , the Q-matrices, for each agent can be: 
 
 
We see here that the payoffs for agent 1 performing action 1 when agent 2 performs 
action 3 =4 (top right cell of M1) 
Suppose that agent 1 updates its Q-values according to 
𝑄ଵ(𝑠, 𝑎ଵ, 𝑎ଶ) = (1 − 𝛼)𝑄ଵ(𝑠, 𝑎ଵ, 𝑎ଶ) + 𝛼[𝑟ଵ + 𝛽𝜋ଵ(𝑠ᇱ)𝑄ଵ(𝑠ᇱ)𝜋ଶ(𝑠ᇱ)] 
 
Where 𝜋ଵ(𝑠ᇱ), 𝜋ଶ(𝑠ᇱ) is a Nash equilibrium. 
 
 
However, in order to determine 𝜋ଶ(𝑠ᇱ), agent 1 has to learn about 𝑄ଶ(𝑠ᇱ). This implies 
that agent 1 has to maintain another Q-matrix, containing the Q-values for the agent 2, 
assuming that agents can observe each other’s rewards and last actions. For an n-agent 
environment, each agent has to maintain n such Q-matrices 
The upshot of this is that total space requirement is 𝑛𝑚𝐴௡; exponential in the number 
of agents and perhaps even infinite. This space requirement is one of the main 
limitations of multi-agent Q-learning, hindering its deployment in real-life, complex 
situations. Some of the other important limitations will be discussed next. 





This rudimentary background suffices to pinpoint several challenges242526 that must be 
overcome before smart pricing agents which rely on sophisticated RL mechanisms can 
adapt to each other’s action, and potentially enter into tacit collusion. 
1. Challenge 1: Preference Specification 
 
At the design stage, it is doubtful that RL pricing agents that follow a standard profit 
maximization function can reach a tacit collusion equilibrium. In multi-agent Q-
learning, each agent’s rewards are related to each other, and cannot be optimized 
independently. Joint actions and rewards should be considered. And the ability of each 
oligopolists to specify such joint actions and rewards for its own RL pricing agent 
payoffs matrix necessitates access to internal information on competitors that is in 
principle private.  
 
Of course one can argue that collusion does not require knowledge of other firms' 
payoff functions but rather other firms' strategies. In this respect, it may be is enough 
to know how other firms will react. Moreover, companies may be able to rely on 
relatively simple market monitoring tools (in the form of spiders or bots) to spy on 
their competitors prices. For instance, in supposedly simple markets like airlines, 
where firms enjoy stable positions, little entry, mature technology and similar input 
costs, such payoffs matrix may be easy to draw.  At the same time, it is totally unclear 
that firms can understand each others strategies when personalised and dynamic 
pricing are combined, even when they resort to data monitoring software. This is 
because the range of price points over which oligopolists must coordinate is virtually 
infinite, and is a function of the number of individual customers times the number of 
time units spent on digital markets. Moreover, the use of data mining technology does 
not eliminate the need to know the underlying business strategy. Observing that your 
rival launches an aggressive sales promotion does not tell you if he is on the verge of 
bankrupcy or if instead he feels strong enough to attempt to bankrupt its rivals. Put 
differently, data mining does not elicit patterns and knowledge that can be trusted 
automatically without verification.27 Lastly, the monitoring of rivals’ prices may be a 
plausible tactic on B2C markets, but much less on B2B markets where information is 
not public. 
 
A possible solution could involve the specification of Nash equilibrium as a preference 
function: the RL pricing agent should strive to attain the situation where it is not better 
off not deviating from its current state given what it expects other RL agents to do. 
However, this specification is alone insufficient to give rise to tacit collusion, for many 
ambient and environmental factors will affect the stability of a collusive Nash 
equilibrium, that are beyond the control of the RL pricing agent. Additional 
                                                          
24 Busoniu, Lucian, Robert Babuska, and Bart De Schutter. "A comprehensive survey of multiagent 
reinforcement learning." IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, And Cybernetics-Part C: Applications 
and Reviews, 38 (2), 2008(2008). 
25 Tesauro, Gerald. "Extending Q-learning to general adaptive multi-agent systems." Advances in neural 
information processing systems. 2004. 
26 Hu, Junling, and Michael P. Wellman. "Nash Q-learning for general-sum stochastic games." Journal 
of machine learning research 4.Nov (2003): 1039-1069 
27 C. Rygielski et al., Data mining techniques for customer relationship management, Technology in 
Society 24 (2002) 483–502. 
12 
 
mechanisms on top of the RL pricing agents would be needed to ensure convergence, 
like contacts between oligopolists to exchange information. 
Last, the RL preference function should be defined so as to ensure the stability of the 
learning mechanism of agents, as well as their adaption to other agents’ dynamic 
behavior.  
2. Challenge 2: Formalizing the Environment and the Data Problem 
As was just hinted, the specification of an appropriate preference function is 
insufficient, in itself, to lead multi-agent Q-Learning systems to tacitly collude. 
Additional steps must be taken to feed the Q-Learning pricing agent with data.  
 
First, payoffs matrices must be defined that provide enough information on the RL 
pricing agent environment, including on its competitive environment. If the rewards 
of other RL pricing agents are not observable – which they should not in a competitive 
market without collusion in its initial state – the construction of a payoffs matrix will 
be complicated. True that it remains possible to use publicly available information as 
a proxy, yet this information will be far from perfect. For instance, a vendor like an 
airlines company can define a script that mimicks an online user, and who then can 
view the airfares of rival airlines. But this information gives just access to pricing data, 
which is just one parameter in the revenue equation (which includes costs, and other 
factors). Moreover, this type of data will only be observable in B2C markets, and less 
likely to be available in B2B markets.  
 
Second, if we model the RL pricing agent environment as a stagewise game, one needs 
to define what exactly constitutes a stage and how long are the periods within stages. 
Each oligopolist may have a different view on this, giving rise to heterogeneity in RL 
pricing agents decisions.   
 
Last, other economic variables may have to be taken into account for the calculation of 
payoffs, including demand forecasts, countervailing buyer power (including vertical 
integration strategies), input prices, etc. This adds another pinch of uncertainty and 
heterogeneity in the performance of multi-agent Q-Learning systems. 
 
3. Challenge 3: Non-stationary Agents and Preference Construction 
 
As  mentioned in Challenge 1, a RL pricing agent must keep track of other learning RL 
pricing agents, resulting in a non-stationary environment. Agents are confronted with 
a trying to “shoot a moving target” problem. Each agent’s optimal actions changes as 
a result of the policies (actions) other agents. Non-stationarity can potentially 
invalidate the convergence properties of Q-learning agents.  
 
To fix this problem, a possibility consists in specifying that RL pricing agents should 
converge towards a Nash equilibrium. Besides the fact that this would necessitate 
oligopolists to agree on algorithmic preference specification – which would be unlawful 
–under the so-called folk theorem, several Nash equilibria can exist, including some in 
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which prices do not converge due to preference construction, time preferences, and 
discount factors.28  
 
4. Challenge 4: Scalability 
 
Scalability is a major concern for Q-learning algorithms.  As previously mentioned, the 
total space requirement of an environment with n agents, A possible actions (for each 
agent), and m states is nmA^n, which is exponential in the number of agents. 
 
Most of the algorithms’ run-time is taken up by calculating Nash equilibrium for 
updating the Q-function. For matrix games, the computational complexity of finding 
an equilibrium is unknown, and approximate methods are often used in n-player 
games .  
 
5. Challenge 5: Exploration v Exploitation 
 
Another challenge concerns the exploration v exploitation trade-off. The exploitation 
choice consists in selecting the action with the maximum Q-value for each state. The 
exploration choice consists in investigating to improve current knowledge (for instance 
by randomly selecting actions with a probability ε).  The exploration v exploitation 
decision confronts Q-learning agents with a trade-off between exploiting their current 
knowledge and exploring to improve the current knowledge. In a multi-agent setting, 
this is challenging, because an RL Q-Learning agent focusing too much on exploration 
will disclose insufficient pricing information, and in turn destabilize the learning 
mechanism of other RL Q-Learning agent willing to explore. 
 
A related issue arises if an agent faces a situation of tie-break. This happens when the 
agent is faced with two actions that will yield two rewards of the same value. It will 




In this paper, we have stressed that the algorithmic tacit collusion conjecture should 
not presently be taken as a given. Significant technological challenges exist that 
undermine the capabilities of Q-learning algorithms to approach a tacit collusion 
equilibrium.  
 
That said, the introduction of Deep RL agents (like Deep Q-Networks) on markets may 
alleviate some of the obstacles to tacit collusion that we have identified. In particular, 
Deep RL agents may be quite effective at learning the Q-values of rival oligopolists. To 
date, Deep RL agents have mostly been used in the context of game AI (for example, 
playing Atari 2600 games v humans).29  And they have proven able to outperform 
humans. With this background, it remains to be seen whether they can actually 
replicate or surpass human conduct and eventually enter more easily into tacit 
collusion. At the time being, this is still an open research question. 
                                                          
28 The folk theorem asserts that any individually rational outcome can arise as a Nash equilibrium in 
infinitely repeated games with sufficiently little discounting. See, for its original formulation, 
Fudenberg, Drew, and Eric Maskin. "The folk theorem in repeated games with discounting or with 
incomplete information." Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society (1986): 533-554. 
29 Mnih, V., Kavukcuoglu, K., Silver, D., Graves, A., Antonoglou, I., Wierstra, D., & Riedmiller, M. (2013). 
Playing atari with deep reinforcement learning. arXiv preprint arXiv:1312.5602. 
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